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Abstract 
Real interest and inflation rates have been very low in many industrialized countries since the 
Great Recession. In this paper, a mechanism of low and floating real interest and inflation rates 
is examined based on the concept a “Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path” and the law 
of motion for trend inflation. I show that, because the link between the marginal product of capital 
and the real interest rate is severed on this path, the real interest rate loses its anchor and therefore 
floats. In addition, the inflation rate floats together with the real interest rate. There are, however, 
upper and lower bounds of the floating rates. It is also likely that the real interest rate floats below 
the marginal product of capital on this path and the inflation rate floats below the target rate of 
inflation. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Real interest rates have been historically low in many industrialized countries since the Great 
Recession (International Monetary Fund, 2014; King and Low, 2014; Bean et al., 2015; Council 
of Economic Advisers, 2015; Hall, 2016). Furthermore, real interest rates have been lower than 
the usually supposed values of marginal product of capital (MPK), which is theoretically equal to 
the rate of time preference (RTP) of households at steady state. RTP is often assumed to be about 
4% annually (see Harashima, 2016a). 
 At the same time, inflation has been also very low in many industrialized countries 
(Kiley, 2015; Arias et al., 2016; Ciccarelli and Osbat, 2017). Furthermore, inflation rates have 
floated below the target rates (usually 2%) of most central banks. For example, although Japan’s 
central bank has continuously injected a huge amount of money into financial markets to achieve 
the implicitly or explicitly expressed 2% target rate of inflation, the consumer price index (CPI) 
of Japan has varied between about 1% and –1% since the 1990s. Theoretically, inflation rates 
should converge at the target rate of inflation, but they have floated below this theoretically 
predicted level for more than a decade in many countries.  
 To explain the observed persistently low real interest rates, Bean et al. (2015) argued 
that there was a simultaneous rise in the overall propensity to save and a decline in the overall 
propensity to invest, and that savings (investments) became relatively insensitive to changes in 
interest. Thwaites (2015) argued that demographics, inequality, and emerging economies played 
important roles and the common underlying factor is a rise in saving. Hall (2016) argued that the 
low real interest rate is attributed to a change in the composition of investors from those with 
higher degrees of risk aversion to those with lower degrees. These arguments seem to be unrelated 
to each other at first glance, but a common thread is that firms have become less inclined to invest 
as household savings have piled up. 
 Low inflation may be explained partly by weak domestic demand and other cyclical 
factors with some sort of Phillips curve (e.g., Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015; Conti et al., 
2015; Del Negro, 2015; Arias et al., 2016; Ciccarelli and Osbat, 2017), but the ways used to 
estimate and interpret the Phillips curve are controversial. Some structural factors may have 
influenced inflation, causing it to remain low. Of these, demographic factors and technological 
progress have attracted particular attention. A declining share in the working-age population may 
have a negative impact on inflation (e.g., Anderson et al., 2014; Deroose and Stevens, 2017), and 
the spread of e-commerce may also decrease inflation (e.g., Ciccarelli and Osbat, 2017), but the 
magnitudes of the impacts of these are not well known. 
 In this paper, a mechanism of low and floating real interest and inflation rates is 
examined from another perspective. Nevertheless, the mechanism shown here may act in 
somewhat similar ways as those reported by Bean et al. (2015), Thwaites (2015), and Hall (2016) 
in that a change in people’s investment behaviors plays an essential role. However, the reasons 
why people changed their behaviors are completely different from those offered by Bean et al. 
(2015), Thwaites (2015), and Hall (2016). 
 As noted above, low and floating real interest and inflation rates have been observed 
since the Great Recession. Hence, the cause of the Great Recession needs to be examined prior to 
examining the mechanism of floating rates. Harashima (2016a) showed a cause of the Great 
Recession based on the concept a “Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path” (NEPIP). The 
concept of NEPIP reported by Harashima (2004a, 2009, 2012, 2016a, 2016d, 2017, 2018) enables 
us to explain a mechanism for why households rationally choose a Pareto inefficient path. Because 
of this choice, phenomena like the Great Recession and the Great Depression can be generated. 
An important feature of NEPIP is that it does not require a sudden huge technological regression 
and persisting rigidities in price adjustment processes to explain the Great Recession.  
 It is also necessary to examine the mechanism by which inflation is determined before 
examining the mechanism of floating rates. In this paper, I use the model of inflation and the law 
of motion for inflation described previously (Harashima 2004b, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 
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2008b, 2013, 2016b, 2016c) because this model offers a micro-founded mechanism of why 
inflation has a persistent nature (i.e., why it has trends). In this model, the persistence of inflation 
is explained without including ad hoc lagged inflation into the model, unlike the case of the hybrid 
new Keynesian Philips curve presented by Galí and Gertler (1999). 
 Here, I show that the link between MPK and the real interest rate is severed on NEPIP. 
As a result, the real interest rate loses its anchor and therefore floats regardless of MPK. If the 
central bank is sufficiently independent, however, the inflation (deflation) rate does not accelerate 
or decelerate; rather, it moves stochastically by the law of motion for trend inflation in the 
abovementioned model of inflation. If the nominal interest rate is kept near zero, the inflation rate 
is equal to zero minus the real interest rate. Therefore, the inflation (deflation) and real interest 
rates are connected and float together regardless of either the target rate of inflation or MPK. 
However, there are upper and lower bounds for the floating rates. Because of these bounds, it is 
likely that, on average, the real interest rate is lower than MPK and the inflation rate is lower than 
the target rate of inflation on NEPIP. In addition, low unemployment, inflation, and real interest 
rates may continue to coexist for a long period after a severe recession or depression is almost 
stabilized. 
 
2  FLOATING REAL INTEREST RATES 
 
2.1  Real interest rates and MPK 
2.1.1  Real interest rate 
The real interest rate cannot be directly observed and is usually substituted with the return on 
government bonds with inflation protection or is indirectly estimated by subtracting the estimated 
rate of expected inflation or realized rate of inflation from the observed nominal rate of return on 
government bonds. In this paper, for simplicity, the real interest rate specifically indicates the 
realized real interest rate (RRIR) calculated by subtracting the realized rate of inflation from the 
observed nominal rate of return on government bonds. Hence, 
 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡                (1) 
 
where rt is RRIR, it is the observed nominal rate of return on government bonds in period t, and 
πt is the realized inflation rate in period t. 
 Note that if the disturbances in inflation are independently and identically distributed, 
RRIR is on average equal to the expected real interest rate calculated by subtracting the expected 
inflation rate from the observed nominal rate of return on government bonds. 
 
2.1.2  Link between RRIR and MPK 
MPK is
t
t
k
y


where yt and kt are production and capital per capita in period t, respectively. Suppose 
that the economy is at steady state or on the saddle path to steady state. Standard economic theory 
tells us that the real interest rate for private sector investments is equal to MPK. In addition, RRIR 
(i.e., the real interest rate for government bonds), is on average also equal to MPK, such that, 
 
𝑟𝑡 =
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 .                               (2) 
 
Note that “on average” is added because RRIR is on average equal to the expected inflation rate. 
The rationale for equation (2) is as follows. Because the economy is at steady state or on the 
saddle path, the government issues new bonds not because it wants to deviate from these states, 
but simply because it wants to replace taxes with borrowings (i.e., reduce current taxes and instead 
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increase taxes in the future when the bonds are redeemed). Because the economy is at steady state 
or on the saddle path, however, there is no excess saving. Therefore, if
t
t
t
k
y
r


 , there is no 
incentive for economic agents to switch from private sector investments to new government bonds. 
On the other hand, if
t
t
t
k
y
r


 , excess demand for new government bonds will be generated. The 
excess demand will be reduced by decreases in rt, and therefore rt will eventually stabilize at the 
level that satisfies equation (2). Hence, government bonds can be sold only when RRIR on 
average satisfies equation (2). If equation (2) is on average satisfied and government bonds are 
sold out at this level of RRIR, the government reduces taxes by the amount substituted with the 
sale of bonds. Because economic agents know about the present tax reduction and future tax 
increase as well as the steady state conditions, they do not increase consumption even if taxes are 
reduced, but instead invest money obtained from the reduced taxes in the private sector. As a 
result, the levels of capital and consumption at steady state and on the saddle path are unaffected 
and maintained even after the government issues new bonds while equation (2) is on average 
satisfied. This logic is basically identical to that in the Ricardian equivalence proposition. 
 Equation (2) indicates that there is a tight link between MPK and RRIR. In other words, 
MPK plays the role of an anchor for RRIR, and RRIR is constrained to be equal to MPK if the 
economy is at steady state or on the saddle path. 
 
2.2  Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path (NEPIP) 
Harashima (2004a, 2009, 2012, 2016a, 2016d, 2017, 2018) showed that it is possible that 
households will rationally choose a Pareto inefficient transition path (i.e., NEPIP) if a shock that 
changes the steady state occurs. The mechanism of this phenomenon is briefly explained in this 
section. 
 It is assumed that households are non-cooperative, risk averse, identical, and infinitely 
living, and that the number of households is sufficiently large. Each household maximizes its 
expected utility 
 
𝐸 ∫ exp(−𝜃𝑡)
∞
0
𝑢(𝑐𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
 
 
subject to 
 
𝑑𝑘𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓(𝐴, 𝑘𝑡) − 𝑐𝑡 
 
where ct is consumption in period t; A is technology; u is the utility function;  tt kAfy ,  is 
the production function;   >θ 0 is RTP; and E is the expectation operator. 
 Suppose that there is a shock that makes the RTP of the representative household (RTP 
RH) shift upward (increase) in period t = 0. After the shock, the steady state is changed from the 
prior (original) one to the posterior one. There are two options for each non-cooperative household 
with regard to consumption just after the shock. The first is a jump option J, in which a 
household’s consumption jumps upward and then proceeds on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle 
path to the posterior steady state. The second is a non-jump option NJ, in which a household’s 
consumption does not jump but instead gradually decreases from the prior steady state to the 
posterior steady state. The household that chose the NJ option reaches the posterior steady state 
in period  0s . The difference in consumption between the two options in each period t is bt (≥ 
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0). The existence of bt indicates that excess capital exists and needs to be eliminated. 
 There is a sufficiently high probability that a household chooses the NJ option because 
option J requires a discontinuous large and sudden increase in consumption but risk-averse 
households intrinsically dislike a discontinuous change in consumption and want to smooth the 
stream of consumption. The expected utility of a household after the shock depends on its choice 
of J or NJ. Let Jalone indicate that a household chooses the J option but the other households 
choose the NJ option, NJalone indicate that a household chooses the NJ option but the other 
households choose the J option, Jtogether indicate that all households choose the J option, and 
NJtogether indicate that all households choose the NJ option. Let  10  pp  be the subjective 
probability of a household that the other households choose option J. The expected utility of the 
household when it chooses option J is, 
 
       JaloneEpJtogetherpEJE  1 , 
 
and when it chooses option NJ is 
 
       NJtogetherEpNJalonepENJE  1 , 
 
where  JaloneE ,  NJaloneE ,  JtogetherE , and  NJtogetherE  are the expected utilities of 
the household when choosing Jalone, NJalone, Jtogether, and NJtogether, respectively. A 
household strategically determines whether to choose the J or NJ option, considering other 
households’ choices. Harashima (2009) proved that, under reasonable conditions, there is a
 10   pp  such that if p = p*,     0 NJEJE , and if p < p*,     0 NJEJE ; that is, it is 
possible for a Pareto inefficient path to be rationally chosen by households. 
 Suppose that there are  NΗ   identical households in the economy where H is 
sufficiently large. Households’ strategic choices between the J and NJ options are well described 
by an Η-dimensional symmetric mixed-strategy game. Let  10  ηη qq  be the probability that 
household  Ηη   chooses option J. Harashima (2009) showed that strategy profiles 
 
(q1,q2,…,qH) = {(1,1,…,1), (
*** ,...,, ppp ), (0,0,…,0)} 
 
are the Nash equilibria of this game. Furthermore, Harashima (2009) showed that if households 
have a risk-averse preference in the sense that they avert the worst scenario when its probability 
is not known, households suppose very low p and select the NJtogether (0,0,…,0) equilibrium, 
which is NEPIP. Because NEPIP is Pareto inefficient and excess capital exists and bt unutilized 
resources are successively generated and destroyed, a recession or depression is generated 
(Harashima, 2004a, 2009, 2012, 2016a, 2016d, 2017). In this situation, as Harashima (2012) 
showed, the unemployment rate rises in the search and matching process of jobs. Harashima 
(2014b) described a generation mechanism for a shock on RTP RH. The main underlying factor 
of this shock is that households need to generate an expected RTP RH under sustainable 
heterogeneity (Harashima, 2014a, 2014b).  
 After an upward shift of RTP RH, MPK begins to increase to reach the posterior steady 
state corresponding to the higher posterior RTP RH. Figure 1 shows the estimated MPK of the 
United States since 2000. The method of estimation is the same as that used in Harashima (2016a) 
and is shown in the Appendix. Because the primary focus is fluctuations of MPK and not its 
absolute level, the value of MPK in 2000 was arbitrarily chosen to be near the 4% value. Figure 
1 indicates that MPK actually increased after the Great Recession although RRIR significantly 
decreased as indicated in the Introduction. Although specific estimates may differ depending on 
the assumptions used, the trend in Figure 1 seems quite reasonable because investments decreased 
and the rate of increase in capital stocks correspondingly decreased after the Great Recession. 
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Figure 1: The estimated MPK of the United States 
 
 
 
2.3  Rationality 
Rational expectations mean model-consistent expectations. Economic agents behave based on 
optimization solutions in the models they know while utilizing all available information. This 
behavior indicates that they behave in principle in accordance with the steady state because 
utilizing all available information requires that the models used be dynamic with an infinite 
horizon, and the optimization solution in a dynamic model in principle indicates the steady state. 
Under rational expectations, therefore, economic agents behave in accordance with the steady 
state and are not affected persistently by temporary disturbances. Because rationality is assumed 
to be fundamental to human nature, in principle it will prevail in any situation, even on NEPIP.
 Behaving in accordance with the steady state even on NEPIP suggests the possibility 
that on NEPIP (i.e., on a “rationally” chosen Pareto inefficient path), no firm will “rationally” 
undertake additional investments even if RRIR is almost zero. Furthermore, households will 
“rationally” deposit their money in banks even if the nominal interest rates of bank deposits are 
almost zero, if these behaviors are in accordance with the steady state. This possibility is examined 
in the following sections. 
 
2.4  Floating RRIR on NEPIP 
2.4.1  Investments, savings, and loans on NEPIP 
2.4.1.1  Investments 
Behaving in accordance with the steady state as shown in Section 2.3 means that firms prioritize 
their sustainability or survivability over present profits because a steady state means persistence 
or indefinite stability. In a static model, sustainability or survivability does not matter, and a firm 
can simply be assumed to be an entity that prioritizes current profit maximization. However, in a 
dynamic model, sustainability or survivability matters greatly to firms. In some cases, earning 
low profits or even experiencing losses at present may be the best strategy for a firm to survive 
0.038
0.0385
0.039
0.0395
0.04
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for a long period, particularly on NEPIP. 
 As shown in Section 2.2, excess capital and bt exist on NEPIP, and capital has to be 
reduced to the posterior steady state level. In this situation, additional investments will likely fail 
quickly and generate losses. A firm that undertakes such an eventually unprofitable investment 
will not survive. Therefore, even if the real lending rates of banks (the nominal lending rates of 
banks minus the inflation rate) to firms are very low and lower than MPK, a firm will not 
undertake additional investments on NEPIP. Note that, in reality, firms will undertake 
investments to replace obsolete machines or introduce the latest technologies even on NEPIP, but 
in this paper, it is assumed for simplicity that there is no capital depreciation and no technological 
progress. 
 Here, suppose that an additional investment generates profits in each period until it fails 
and generates losses when it fails. Suppose also that firms have to borrow money from banks to 
undertake investments and the real lending rate of banks is equal to RRIR. A firm will undertake 
a new investment if 
 
𝐸 [∑(𝜇𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡) − 𝑙
𝑣
𝑡=0
] > 0                          (3) 
 
is satisfied, where μt is the real return on the investment (the nominal return on the investment 
minus the inflation rate) in period t, 𝑣 (> 0) is the period when the investment fails, and l is the 
initial investment and indicates the loss when it fails in period v. Hence, 𝐸(𝑣) indicates the 
expected length of period before the fail. 𝐸(𝑣) = ∞ means that the investment is not expected 
to fail indefinitely and thereby   0lE . 
 In a normal period (i.e., not on NEPIP), if rt > θP on the saddle path (θP indicates RTP 
RH), there are many investment opportunities that satisfy condition (3) because 𝐸(𝑣) will be a 
large number, and many investments will be undertaken until the economy reaches steady state. 
However, because excess capital exists on NEPIP, 𝐸(𝑣) is far shorter than that in the normal 
period because economic agents who behave in accordance with the steady state do not purchase 
products that are not in accordance with the steady state. Put more intuitively, because the overall 
demand is shrinking on NEPIP, an additional investment will soon fail. Here, “additional” means 
a deviation from the state that is in accordance with the steady state. Hence, for many investment 
opportunities on NEPIP, 
 
𝐸 ∑(𝜇𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡)
𝑣
𝑡=0
< 𝐸(𝑙) 
 
because of the short  vE . It will be difficult to satisfy condition (3) even if the real lending rate 
of banks (i.e., RRIR [rt]) is relatively low. As a result, additional investments will be rarely 
undertaken on NEPIP. 
 Note that some additional investments may be sustainable even on NEPIP, but only if 
part of the existing capital with a value equivalent to these additional investments is destroyed. 
 
2.4.1.2  Savings and loans 
Because additional investments are rarely undertaken on NEPIP, firms rarely borrow money from 
banks even if RRIR is very low, and banks cannot easily find new borrowers. On the other hand, 
if RRIR is very low, the real interest rate for bank deposits also becomes very low because banks 
still need to earn profits. Even if the real deposit rate is very low, however, households will still 
deposit money into banks on NEPIP because their consumption levels are lower than the level 
that satisfies Pareto efficiency, as shown in Section 2.2.  
 As a result, a large amount of savings is additionally deposited in banks by households, 
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but the banks can rarely lend money to firms for additional investments. Therefore, a large amount 
of excess money is generated inside banks. The gap between deposits and loans has to be 
destroyed (e.g., some banks fail), unless the government intervenes. 
 Note that the very low real deposit rate indicates that the interest income of households 
from their deposits in banks is smaller on NEPIP than in a normal period. This means that some 
of the excess capital that should eventually be destroyed is destroyed through the lower real 
deposit rate (i.e., the lower RRIR); that is, households’ savings in banks are invested in less or 
unproductive projects (i.e., government bonds) by banks. 
 
2.4.1.3  Government bonds fill the gap between savings and loans 
If the government intervenes, however, the situation can change. If the government additionally 
issues a considerable amount of bonds, banks can survive because they can fill the gap between 
deposits and loans by purchasing the government bonds. Even if RRIR is very low, it is better for 
banks to buy the government bonds than to hold money without any return. Conversely, even if 
RRIR is very low and lower than MPK, the government bonds are strongly demanded by banks. 
This persistent disparity between RRIR and MPK indicates that they are determined differently 
on NEPIP. 
 As Harashima (2017) showed, filling the gap by issuing additional government bonds 
will significantly delay the economy’s arrival at the posterior steady state; that is, the transition 
period from the prior to the posterior steady state is significantly prolonged. Hence, if the 
government continues to intervene, the period when RRIR and MPK are determined differently 
will continue for a longer period. 
 If sufficient amounts of government bonds are not supplied to financial markets or the 
central bank absorbs a large part of them, some banks may eventually fail because they cannot 
obtain sufficient profit by purchasing government bonds. On NEPIP, some central banks may be 
tempted to purchase a large amount of government bonds to boost their economies (i.e., to 
implement quantitative easing), but excessive quantitative easing will hurt banks. 
 
2.4.2  Severed link between RRIR and MPK on NEPIP 
As shown in Section 2.1, in the normal period, a tight link exists between RRIR and MPK, and 
RRIR on average equals MPK as equation (2) indicates. However, on NEPIP, RRIR and MPK 
are determined differently as discussed in Section 2.4.1; that is, the link between them is severed. 
Hence, MPK no longer acts as an anchor for RRIR, RRIR is not constrained to be equal to MPK 
on NEPIP, and equation (2) does not hold. In addition, the arguments in Sections 2.4.1.1 and 
2.4.1.2 indicate that RRIR is basically lower than MPK on NEPIP; that is, 
 
𝑟𝑡 <
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 . 
 
2.4.3  Floating RRIR 
Without MPK as an anchor, RRIR floats on NEPIP and can take various values depending on the 
supply and demand for government bonds and the inflation rate in each period. An important 
point is that whatever values RRIR take, the paths of consumption and investment are not affected 
by RRIR on NEPIP because economic agents behave in accordance with the steady state, as 
shown in Section 2.3. 
 As Harashima (2012, 2017) noted, however, the unemployment rate will decrease as the 
level of capital approaches the level at the posterior steady state and excess capital and bt decrease, 
or as bt is almost filled by increases in government expenditure financed by new government 
bonds. However, even if excess capital and bt decrease to very low levels or bt is almost filled by 
increases in government expenditure, additional investments will still be rarely undertaken even 
though RRIR is very low, as long as any excess capital and bt remain, as shown in Section 2.4.1.1. 
As a result, although the unemployment rate decreases as the economy approaches the posterior 
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steady state or bt is almost filled by increases in government expenditure, RRIR will continue to 
float and stay at historically low rates. 
 In addition, if a government continues to intervene through issuing additional large 
quantities of government bonds and increasing government expenditures, it will significantly 
delay the economy’s arrival at the posterior steady state, as shown in Section 2.4.1.3 and reported 
by Harashima (2017), and RRIR will continue to float and be historically low for a long period. 
 
3  FLOATING INFLATION (DEFLATION) RATE 
 
3.1  Law of motion for trend inflation 
Harashima (2004b, 2008b, 2016b) presented a model of inflation (deflation) and a law of motion 
for trend inflation. This law is explained briefly in this section. Because the nominal rate of return 
on government bonds (it) is  
 
𝑖𝑡 = ∫ ∫ 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝜈𝑑𝑠
𝑠+1
𝑠
𝑡
𝑡−1
+ 𝑟 
 
and because
Pθr  at steady state, the law of motion is 
 
∫ ∫ 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝜈𝑑𝑠
𝑠+1
𝑠
𝑡
𝑡−1
= 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜃𝐺 − 𝜃𝑃                    (4) 
 
at steady state such that ġ𝑡 = 0, ?̇?𝑡 = 0, ?̇?𝑡 = 0, and ?̇?𝑡 = 0 by the simultaneous optimization 
of government and households, where
Gθ  and Pθ  are the RTPs of the government and 
representative household, respectively; r is RRIR at steady state; and πt is the inflation rate, gt is 
the per capita real government expenditure, and xt is the per capita real tax revenue at time t. The 
mechanism by which the RTP of government is formed is shown in Harashima (2015b). By the 
law of motion (i.e., by equation [4]), if θG = θP at steady state, inflation (deflation) does not 
accelerate or decelerate. Note that if
Pθr  but rr  where r is a constant, the law of motion is 
modified to 
 
∫ ∫ 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝜈𝑑𝑠
𝑠+1
𝑠
𝑡
𝑡−1
= 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜃𝐺 − ?̅? ,                    (5) 
 
and if rθG  at steady state, inflation (deflation) does not accelerate or decelerate. 
 A solution of integral equation (4) for given
Gθ and Pθ is 
 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 6(𝜃𝐺 − 𝜃𝑃)𝑡
2 . 
 
Generally, the path of inflation that satisfies equation (4) for t0 is expressed as 
 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 6(𝜃𝐺 − 𝜃𝑃)exp[𝑧𝑡ln(𝑡)] , 
 
where zt is a time-dependent variable. If tπ satisfies equation (4) for t0 , and  tπ  for 
11  t , then 
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lim
𝑡→∞
𝑧𝑡 = 2 . 
 
 Harashima (2016b) showed that even in a period of deflation, if the central bank is 
sufficiently independent, households expect that θG = θP (or rθG  ). Therefore, deflation does 
not accelerate or decelerate even though the central bank lowers the nominal interest rate to zero. 
 
3.2  Inflation (deflation) on NEPIP 
By the law of motion for trend inflation, if the central bank is sufficiently independent and 
households expect that θG = θP (or rθG  ), inflation (deflation) does not accelerate or decelerate 
and moves stochastically, whether or not the economy is on NEPIP. However, in a normal period, 
in addition to equation (4) or (5), equations (1) and (2) also have to be satisfied. Hence, the 
inflation (deflation) rate moves stochastically but within a very narrow range in which equation 
(2) is on average satisfied; that is, it moves in the neighborhood of the target rate of inflation (an 
inflationary steady state) or zero minus MPK (a deflationary steady state). On NEPIP, however, 
although equation (1) is also satisfied as with the case of a normal period, equation (2) is not 
necessarily satisfied as described in Section 2.4. Therefore, the inflation (deflation) rate is not 
constrained to move in the neighborhood of the target rate of inflation or zero minus MPK. 
 Suppose that the central bank is sufficiently independent and households expect that θG 
= θP (or rθG  ), and in addition, the central bank makes the nominal rate of return on 
government bonds zero (i.e., i = 0). Hence, by equation (1) 
 
tt πr   .                               (6) 
 
In a normal period, if equation (6) holds, 
 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
= −𝜋𝑡                              (7) 
 
 
for any t by equation (2); that is, the deflation rate is equal to MPK (i.e., the inflation rate is equal 
to zero minus MPK). Equation (7) is superficially equivalent to the Friedman rule. On NEPIP, 
however, equation (7) does not necessarily hold even if equation (6) holds because equation (2) 
does not hold. The link between the inflation rate and MPK does not exist on NEPIP. 
 Note that the reason why the central bank makes i = 0 is generally to initiate or support 
the “recovery” of the economy from NEPIP. However, because NEPIP was strategically and 
rationally chosen by households and the link between RRIR and MPK is severed on NEPIP, 
households do not deviate from NEPIP even when facing a zero nominal interest rate. That is, 
monetary policies will be ineffective to improve an economy on NEPIP. 
 
3.3  Floating inflation (deflation) rate 
On NEPIP with i = 0, the inflation rate is not necessarily equal to zero minus MPK, as shown in 
Section 3.2, and RRIR is also not necessarily equal to MPK, as shown in Section 2.4. Hence, both 
the inflation (deflation) rate and RRIR have no anchor and commonly float. Nevertheless, because 
equation (6) holds even on NEPIP with i = 0, the inflation (deflation) rate and RRIR are connected 
and therefore float together. 
 As shown in Section 2.4.3 and Harashima (2012, 2017), as the economy approaches the 
posterior steady state or if bt is almost filled by increases in government expenditure, the 
unemployment rate decreases. However, RRIR still floats as long as the excess capital and bt 
remain, and the inflation (deflation) rate also floats together with RRIR. In addition, if the 
government continues to intervene, it will take a long time for the economy to reach the posterior 
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steady state, as shown in Section 2.4.1.3. As a result, a low unemployment rate, low inflation, and 
low RRIR may continue to coexist for a long period after a severe recession is almost stabilized. 
A situation like this occurred with the U.S. economy in the 1950s after the period when the Great 
Depression had almost been stabilized. 
 
4  RANGE OF FLOATING RATES 
 
Both inflation (deflation) and RRIR float together on NEPIP, but they cannot float without any 
constraint. Upper and lower bounds exist. 
 
4.1  Upper (lower) bound of RRIR (inflation) 
If the deflation rate (i.e., 
tπ ) exceeds MPK, the real lending rates of banks would exceed MPK 
even if the nominal lending rate was zero. Therefore, if this level of deflation continues, many 
firms will not pay back their bank loans and will go bankrupt, and eventually the economy will 
collapse. Because households know of this consequence and behave in accordance with the steady 
state, it is highly unlikely that they generate the expectation that deflation exceeds MPK. 
 Furthermore, if the economy’s collapse was expected because deflation rates were 
persistently larger than MPK, the government would annul the central bank’s independence and 
behave very myopically. Thereby, the expected θG would sharply increase and the deflation would 
turn to inflation (probably hyper-inflation) by equation (4) or (5). Households also know about 
this devastating consequence, and therefore will not generate an expected deflation rate larger 
than MPK. 
 This means there is the upper bound for the deflation rate on NEPIP (i.e., MPK). 
Conversely, the lower bound of the inflation rate on NEPIP is zero minus MPK. In addition, for i 
= 0, the upper bound of RRIR on NEPIP is also MPK by equation (6). Note, however, because of 
initial confusion among people in the initial stage of NEPIP, the deflation rate may temporarily 
exceed MPK. 
 
4.2  Lower (upper) bound of RRIR (inflation) 
Given a sufficiently independent central bank, households will not expect inflation rates higher 
than the central bank’s target rate of inflation (π*) because if the rate exceeds π*, the independent 
central bank must raise the nominal interest rate enough to bring the inflation rate down to π*. 
Unlike the zero lower bound in the case of lowering the nominal interest rate, there is no upper 
bound for raising it, so the central bank can raise it as much as necessary. As described by 
Harashima (2007b, 2008b), faced with an intentionally raised nominal interest rate, the 
government is forced to change its behavior to one that is consistent with π*, and thereby the 
inflation rate will converge at π*. Therefore, the upper bound of the inflation rate on NEPIP is the 
target rate of inflation (π*). In addition, for i = 0, the lower bound of RRIR on NEPIP is zero 
minus the target rate of inflation (–π*) by equation (6). 
 
4.3  Range 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that RRIR floats between MPK and zero minus the target rate of 
inflation (–π*) on NEPIP, and the inflation rate floats between the target rate of inflation (π*) and 
zero minus MPK. For example, suppose that the target rate of inflation is 2%, the MPK at steady 
state is 4%, and the nominal rate of return on government bonds is zero. In this case, RRIR floats 
between –2% and 4%, and the inflation rate floats between 2% and –4%. On average, RRIR will 
be 1% and the inflation rate will be –1% (i.e., 1% deflation) on NEPIP. This example implies that, 
on average, RRIR is lower than MPK and the inflation rate is lower than the target rate of inflation 
on NEPIP. This property is consistent with the recently observed low inflation and real interest 
rates and the empirical estimates presented in Harashima (2016a). 
 11 
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Recently, both RRIRs and inflation rates have been very low in many industrialized countries. 
Theoretically, RRIR is equal to MPK, and the inflation rate converges at the target rate of inflation 
set by the central bank, but in reality, RRIR and the inflation rate have been below MPK and the 
target rate of inflation, respectively. That is, they have both floated for a long period below 
theoretically predicted levels. 
 In this paper, a mechanism of low and floating RRIRs and inflation rates was examined 
based on the concept of NEPIP described by Harashima (2004a, 2009, 2012, 2016a, 2016d, 2017, 
2018) and the law of motion for trend inflation presented by Harashima (2004b, 2006, 2007a, 
2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2013, 2016b, 2016c). I showed that, because the link between MPK and 
RRIR is severed on NEPIP, RRIR loses its anchor and floats. In addition, the inflation (deflation) 
rate also floats together with RRIR on NEPIP. However, upper and lower bounds exist for the 
floating rates. Because of these bounds, it is likely that, on average, RRIR is lower than MPK and 
the inflation rate is lower than the target rate of inflation on NEPIP. In addition, low 
unemployment rates, low inflation, and low RRIRs may continue to coexist for a long period after 
a severe recession or depression is almost stabilized, for example, the period in the U.S. economy 
in the 1950s after the Great Depression was almost stabilized.  
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Appendix 
 
MPK (
t
t
k
y


) in Figure 1 was estimated using capital stock data and an assumed rate of average 
technological progress. The production function was assumed to be a Harrod-neutral production 
function such that α
t
α
tt kAy
 1 ; thus, 
 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
= 𝐴𝑡
𝛼(1 − 𝛼)𝑘𝑡
−𝛼 ,                        (A1) 
 
 
where At is technology in period t, and α is a constant that indicates the labor share. I estimated 
the time-series data of 
t
t
k
y


based on equation (A1), with data for kt and assumed values of At and 
α. 
 Data for kt were derived from the chain-type quantity index for private nonresidential 
fixed assets in National Economic Accounts. α was set at 0.7, which is a typical value for labor 
share, and α
tA  was assumed to grow at a constant rate of 1.25% annually. This means that 
technology was assumed to progress constantly. This rate of growth was adopted based on an 
average annual per capita GDP growth rate of 1.8% because, if sustainable heterogeneity is 
satisfied, the growth rate of At is equal to the growth rate of yt on a balanced growth path. 
Therefore, the growth rate of α
tA is (1.018
0.7 − 1) × 100 = 1.25%. Because the primary focus 
is fluctuations of MPK and not its absolute level, the value of MPK in 2000 was arbitrarily chosen 
to be near the 4% value.  
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